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1. Introduction 
In the literature the prime focus is on labor supply and investment decisions when studying behavioral 
effects of tax changes, and income growth among certain population groups is usually attributed to 
real effects induced by altered tax schedules. Similarly, the literature on effects of taxation of owners 
of small businesses considers entry and exit, assuming that a move into paid employment reflects a 
change in occupation. However, shifts into paid employment may simply be concealed tax avoidance, 
indicating that the active owners have chosen another legal organizational form for their firm, and the 
income growth that follows this move is simply reflecting a shift in their form of compensation. In this 
paper it is argued that the Norwegian dual income tax encouraged owners of small businesses to 
organize their activities in a widely held corporation, and we provide empirical evidence of such 
behavior. 
 A dual income tax system is characterized by combining a low proportional tax rate on 
capital income with a progressive tax rate on labor income, and was introduced in the Nordic countries 
in the early nineties.1 Other countries have moved in the same direction, in pursuit of more lenient 
taxation of capital items, see the list in Sørensen (2005, p. 778). As stated by Sørensen (1994), the 
taxation of small businesses is the Achilles heel of the dual income tax. For medium and high income 
classes, the wide disparity between marginal tax rates on capital and labor income provides an 
incentive for income shifting from labor income to capital income in order to minimize tax payments. 
This necessitates special income-splitting rules for small businesses; see Lindhe et al. (2004) and 
Alstadsæter (2007) for descriptions of the different solutions chosen in the Nordic countries. 
 The Norwegian version of a dual income tax system, introduced with the tax reform of 
1992, implies that both the self-employed individuals and owners of closely held corporation (i.e., 
corporation where more than two thirds of the shares are owned by individuals who are active in the 
daily operation of the business) are subject to splitting of incomes into capital and labor income tax 
bases, with a progressive surtax schedule in work for labor income. This dual income tax system 
encourages some owners of small businesses to choose incorporation into a widely held corporation, 
dependent on firm characteristics, enabling them to reduce their tax bill by paying themselves 
shareholder income instead of managerial wage. We hypothesize that the wedge between the marginal 
tax rates on labor income and capital income as well as the mandatory income splitting for self-
employed and owners of closely held corporation encourage conversion to widely held corporation. 
                                                     
1 The dual income tax was introduced in Sweden in 1991, Norway 1992, and Finland 1993. The idea originated in Denmark, 
and was implemented in their 1985 tax reform. Later they introduced a hybrid system, mostly due to redistributive concerns; 
see Sørensen (1994, 1998), Cnossen (2000) and Boadway (2004) for more on the dual income tax. 
4 
This is a continous process, not driven by a particular tax change. Rather, it is driven by the incentives 
inherent in the Norwegian dual income tax system. Whether the firms shift legal form or not, depends 
on the type of business they are running and on the level of profits they generate. In the present paper 
we study this empirically by analyzing register-based panel data for the period 1993–2003, i.e., a 
period of 11 years with the 1992 reform in place. We analyze income gains, organizational shifts and 
tax system designs, evaluating outcomes and incentives for tax-payers involved in such activities.  
 Such analyses require data with high informational content. In standard micro data, 
owners of small businesses who incorporate for tax reasons will appear in the statistics as exits out of 
self-employment and as entries into paid employment, as they now formally are employees in a 
corporation. It is therefore crucial to obtain information about ownership of shares. Data retrieved 
from the newly established Register of Shareholders and other public register allowed us to identify 
individuals who combine being an employee with being a major shareholder in the same corporation. 
In the present analysis we link this information to panel data, based on income tax returns for the 
period 1993–2003.  
 Contrary for instance to Romanov (2006), we do not rely on specific tax changes to 
identify the relationship between taxes and organizational shifts. The empirical strategy uses the panel 
design of data, dividing the time period into three: 1993–1995, 1996–2000 and 2001–2003. Only 
business owners who are sole proprietors or in a closely held corporation in the first period (1993–
1995) are included. We explore the longer middle period for evidence of organizational. This allows 
us to discuss relations between (predetermined) first period factors and second period shifts. We also 
want to examine whether shifting resulted in increased income. By comparing the income of “shifters” 
and “nonshifters” in period 3 (2001–2003) and period 1 (1993–1995), we can assess the effect of 
organizational shift on income growth. An alternative explanation is that small firms change 
organizational setup as a step in their life cycle: as firms grow and mature, incorporation is a natural 
policy.  
 In this setup, shift and income growth are simultaneous variables. In fact, income growth 
could also be used as an explanatory variable for shift. Thus, an instrumental variable regression 
approach, using first period characteristics as instruments for shifts, establishes relationships between 
the main variables of the issues raised in this study: income growth, organizational shifts and features 
of the Norwegian dual income tax system. We derive estimates for the effect of shifting on income 
growth by using a difference-of-difference specification and instrumental variables techniques, and we 
also compare parameter estimates from this set-up to ordinary least squares estimates. Moreover, 
relationships between shifting and specific properties of the dual income tax system are discussed 
separately by estimating a probit model for the shift decision. 
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 We find evidence that owners of small businesses choose a widely held form organization 
because of the interaction between business characteristics and features of the dual income tax, and 
that they have experienced a considerable income gain from these shifts. To our knowledge, the 
present paper is the first to combine information from individual panel data and corporate data to 
analyze organizational shifts. In general, the empirical evidence of effects taxation on organizational 
shifts is scarce; some recent exceptions are Gordon and Slemrod (2000), Goolsbee (2004), and 
Romanov (2006).  
 It would also be fair to say that (macro data) indications of income shifting activities of 
the type discussed here was a major reason for reforming the Norwegian 1992 tax system. The new 
system, which came into force in 2006, has as its main feature a shareholder income tax, above a 
normal after-tax rate of return; see Sørensen (2005) for further details. This issue is discussed in 
Section 2 of this paper, where we also go through the literature on taxes and organizational form 
choices. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 3 we lay out the incentives for 
organizational shifts under the dual income tax and provide some illustrative examples to identify 
conditions which render incorporation into a widely held corporation probable. In Section 4 we probe 
deeper into the available data and present the methodological approach to identify the effects of the 
dual income tax system on organizational shifts and the contribution from shifts to income growth. 
Results are discussed in Section 5, and the summary in Section 6 closes the paper. 
2. Background  
The issue raised in this paper is important at least for two reasons: Firstly, the Norwegian dual income 
tax system was recently reformed (mostly) because of anticipation of the type activities discussed in 
this paper, and, secondly, there is a shortage of empirical evidence on such behavior in the tax 
literature.  
 With respect to organizational shifts and the Norwegian tax policy debate, policy-makers 
decided that the 1992 dual income tax system needed reforming.2 A new system duly came into force 
in 2006. Its main feature is a shareholder income tax; see Sørensen (2005) on this. One important 
reason for increased taxation of income from shares was to make it less attractive to shift 
organizational form to reduce the tax bill. Shifting was seen to erode the dual income tax system and 
produce undesirable distributional effects. But it is fair to say that the tax system was changed on basis 
of what aggregate statistics seemed to indicate, as in Figure 1, and anecdotal evidence, rather than 
incontestable empirical findings. Figure 1 shows the changing balance between widely held 
                                                     
2 We return to a more detailed description of the Norwegian tax reform of 1992 below. 
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corporations and self-employed (or sole proprietorships) and closely held corporations, in the period 
1993–2003.  
 There are few analyses in the literature of businesses’ tax motivated shifts in 
organizational form. Following Harberger (1962), it was usually assumed that the organizational form 
preference is determined more by non-tax factors, that it varies little within sectors and that some 
sectors are predominantly corporate while others are non-corporate. Gravelle and Kotlikoff (1989) 
showed that the choice of organizational form in fact varies within sectors, and that the share of 
corporations in different sectors varies over time. Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1994) estimate the size 
of non-tax costs needed to reconcile the observed fraction of firms choosing the non-corporate form 
with the fraction that would be forecasted by theory. However, they argue that removing differential 
tax treatments gives small efficiency gains.  
 
Figure 1. Number of owners of small businesses in various organizational forms, 1993-2003 
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 Recently, tax motivation has received increased attention. For instance, Slemrod (1995) 
and Gordon and Slemrod (2000) emphasize that what might appear at first blush to be real effects of 
taxes, such as shifts in firms’ legal organizational form, may be income shifting between tax bases 
with the sole purpose of minimizing tax payments for the owners of the firm. Most empirical papers in 
this literature rely on US firm level data. Under the US tax code, there is a tax incentive for high-
income firms to shift out of the corporate form and be taxed instead as a personal entity. This is 
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particularly prevalent for smaller, owner-operated firms. Ayers et al. (1996) analyze the probability of 
being corporate given the characteristics of the firm, and MacKie-Mason and Gordon (1997) and 
Goolsbee (1998) analyze the effects on the corporate share of capital for each sector on aggregate 
historical data. They all conclude that the choice of organizational form is influenced by tax rate 
differences. But the reported effects are generally small and it seems that non-tax factors, such as 
business control, are likely to dominate in the decision. However, Goolsbee (2004) finds relative tax 
difference between personal and corporate taxation to be an important factor in the firms' choice of 
organizational form, and Gentry (1994) finds that the choice between limited partnerships and 
corporations relates to tax and non-tax factors in predicted ways.3  
 There is little empirical work on the effects of a dual income tax system on income 
shifting between tax bases. Two recent exceptions are Romanov (2006) and Pirttilä and Selin (2006). 
Romanov explores two recent Israeli tax increases on wage and self-employed income. The number of 
Israeli corporations increased by 5 percent during this period, and Romanov identifies many of these 
new corporations as tax shelters for high-income professionals. He concludes that high-income 
individuals seem to have responded to these tax increases by incorporating in order to receive their 
income as tax favored dividends instead of wages. Pirttilä and Selin evaluate the effect on taxable 
income by the Finnish 1993 dual tax reform and its split model of business taxation. They document 
an increase in taxable capital income of the self-employed individuals after the reform, interpreted as 
resulting from tax minimizing income shifting to the capital income tax base by the self-employed 
individuals.  
3. The dual income tax and incentives to incorporate 
In this section we explore the relationship between the dual income tax system and incentives to shift. 
We provide an overview of the different elements of the Norwegian version of the dual income tax, 
and discuss determinants of businesses’ choices given these features, leading up to the empirical 
analyses of sections 4 and 5. 
3.1. Description of the Norwegian dual income tax, 1992-2004 
The Norwegian version of the dual income involves a flat, “basic” tax rate that applies to business 
income at firm level, and to capital and labor income at the personal level.  This basic tax rate was 
fixed at 28 percent for the whole period after the introduction of this scheme in 1992. Dividends are 
                                                     
3 See also Auerbach (2002) for a general introduction to taxation and corporate behaviour. 
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tax exempt.4 In addition, labor income is taxed by a progressive surtax and by a social security tax. In 
other words, top marginal tax rates for wage incomes are substantially higher than the marginal tax 
rate on capital income. Post-1992 social security tax has been held at a steady 7.8 percent for wage 
earners and 10.7 percent for the self-employed. However, the surtax system was changed. In 1992, the 
top marginal labor income tax rate was 48.8 percent for wage earners; by 2001 it had risen to 55.3 
percent, see Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 For medium and high income classes, wide differences separate the marginal tax rates on 
capital and labor income, as displayed for different income classes in Table A1 in the Appendix. This 
increases the incentive to shift income from labor income to capital income and minimize tax 
payments. These incentives are particularly prevalent for owners of small businesses, who can decide 
how much to pay themselves in wages and how much of the business income to distribute as tax 
exempt dividends. Thus, a system for imputing the return to capital and labor in small businesses is 
required to counteract this kind of income shifting and erosion of the tax base. The Norwegian split 
model applies to self-employed (or sole proprietorships) and closely held corporations. A corporation 
is defined as closely held if two thirds or more of the shares is held by active owners, where an owner 
is characterized as active if he works more than 300 hours annually in the firm, and passive otherwise. 
Spouses or under-aged children of active owners are not recognized as passive owners. A corporation 
is defined as widely held if more than one third of the shares is held by passive owners. Employers' 
social security contributions (the payroll tax) apply to all wage payments made by the corporation, but 
do not apply to the imputed return to labor under the split model, the calculation of which is described 
below. The contribution varies from 14.1 percent to zero according to regional zones.  
 Under the split model, an imputed return to the capital invested in the firm is calculated 
by multiplying the value of the capital assets by a fixed rate of return on capital, which is set annually 
by the legislator on the basis of average rate of return on government bonds plus a risk premium. In 
1993, this imputation rate was 16 percent, but down by 2001 to 10 percent. The capital assets include 
physical business capital, acquired goodwill and other intangible assets, business inventories, and 
credit extended to customers net of debt to the firm's suppliers. The imputed return to capital is taxed 
at the basic tax rate, which equals the capital income tax rate at the individual level. Business profit net 
of imputed return to capital is the imputed return to labor, which is taxed as labor income, independent 
of whether the wages are actually paid to the owner or not. However, when labor income exceeds a 
given threshold, incomes are taxed by the basic tax rate only; see Table A1 in the Appendix. A salary 
deduction of a given percentage of the corporation’s wage costs applies to the owner's imputed return 
                                                     
4 There was a dividend tax of 11 percent from September 2000 to December 2001. Both the introduction and the removal of 
this tax were anticipated by the agents. For instance, in the data we have available, we observe one business owner who took 
out NOK148 million in dividends in 2000, 0 in 2001, and NOK871 million in 2002. 
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to labor above a given threshold. In 1993 this rate was 12 percent, while it already two years later 
increased to 20 percent and stayed at this level for the rest of the period in question. If imputed labor 
income is negative, the loss does not offset other income; it can be carried forward and deducted 
against future imputed labor income in the firm.5  
 In particular, smaller, profitable firms with concentrated ownership have incentives to 
avoid the split model and become widely held: most of their profit can then be paid as tax exempt 
dividends. In theory, the split model should prevent firms from becoming widely held for tax 
purposes, as the required one third of passive owners receive one third of the dividends, which works 
as an additional “tax” on distributed profits. But if these passive owners are adult children, for 
instance, the active owner internalizes these dividends in the family. It acquires the nature of a 
perfectly legal tax free intergenerational transfer. There are other, illegal, ways of avoiding paying 
dividends to passive owners, such as having pro forma owners who return most of the dividends to the 
active owner, or having cross ownerships in similar firms. 
 We conclude this section by emphasizing that this paper discusses tax incentives that 
affect a particular type of firm: the smaller, profitable firm with concentrated ownership, where the 
active owner actually manages the firm on a daily basis. It does not apply to larger firms with many 
owners, and especially not to firms listed on the stock exchange.  
3.2. Illustrating economic outcomes conditional on organizational choice 
The choice of organizational form is influenced by tax and non-tax factors. The two most important 
non-tax factors are often assumed to be risk and access to capital, as suggested by Gordon and 
MacKie-Mason (1994) and Scholes et al. (2002). In case of bankruptcy, the owner of a corporation 
“only” loses his share of the capital, while the owner of a liable firm is personally responsible for all 
debt of the firm and might be for years to come. This may be particularly important in a start-up phase. 
It will also be an important factor for firms in particularly risky industries, as documented by Ayers et 
al. (1996). Firms with higher risk have incentives to incorporate to avoid the personal liability of the 
owner.  
 The corporate form can provide easier access to new capital. Corporations are subject to 
stricter accounting and revising requirements, which makes monitoring for the outsider easier and can 
simplify the process of raising new capital either from financial institutions or issuing shares. On the 
                                                     
5 If there is more than one active owner in the corporation, the imputed return to labor is divided among the active owners 
according to their ownership shares. There is nevertheless a cap for the labor income tax liability of an active owner's 
imputed return to labor, above which all income is treated as dividend income from the corporation. This cap has varied over 
time, and a separation of liberal and non-liberal occupation has also been introduced, see Table A1 in the Appendix. 
10 
other hand, these accounting requirements also mean additional costs, in addition to the transaction 
cost of changing organizational form.  
 Other non-tax factors might influence the choice of legal organizational form, such as 
size, age, preference for control, and transferability of ownership. On the one hand, younger firms may 
prefer to be incorporated and reduce personal liability in the event of bankruptcy in the start-up phase. 
On the other, in a life cycle perspective, self-employment might be seen as the most convenient 
organizational form in the start-up phase for a single entrepreneur, but as the firm grows, both in 
turnover and in number of employees, and needs to attract more capital, the corporate form becomes 
more attractive. Owners are more likely to hire managers as firms become larger. But the separation of 
ownership and management creates potential costs and incentive problems. Some of these costs/risks 
can be reduced by incorporating. Thus, large firms are expected to incorporate, as noted by Ayers et 
al. (1996). 
 Especially for smaller firms with concentrated ownership, the owner’s preference for 
control of the daily operation of the firm can be an important factor in the choice of organizational 
form. He may in fact be willing to forego potential tax savings or other monetary benefits of shifting 
legal organizational form in order to remain in control of the firm. This point is emphasized by 
Alstadsæter and Wangen (2007). Finally, it is easier to transfer ownership under the corporate form.  
 In order to illustrate the income shifting incentives inherent under the Norwegian dual 
income tax, we now describe the after-tax income of an active owner who generates a given sales 
income in his firm under the three different organizational forms of self employed (s), closely held (c), 
and widely held (v). We simplify by assuming that the labor supply and the firm's capital level are 
given. We do not consider investment decisions and we also assume no depreciation in the period in 
question. There is no taxation of wealth.  
 The active owner chooses the organizational form that maximizes his utility U. His utility 
depends positively on after-tax income Y and on the level of control, h, that he exerts in the daily 
operation of the firm. The entrepreneurial individual prefers to be the sole owner of his firm and be in 
charge of all decisions himself. At the same time, the self-employed individual carries all risk of the 
business and he is personally responsible for all claims towards the firm. Let the parameter p represent 
the risk of bankruptcy. The individual specific utility function determines how risk averse the 
individual is, as well as how he values income versus control over his firm. It explains why 
entrepreneurs who clearly would increase their after-tax income by becoming widely held corporations 
stay with the split model; they simply value the “entrepreneurial freedom” higher. The utility function 
is given by 
(1) ( ) { }, , , , ,j j j jU U Y h p j s c v= ∈ . 
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 The firm holds real capital K, which is financed through debt. In the case of the self-
employed, the debt is private, and the individual is personally responsible for all claims towards the 
firm. In the case of a corporate organizational form, debt is held in the corporation and the individual 
is not personally responsible for any claims towards the firm, and he can at most lose his invested 
share.6 As there is no depreciation, the cost of capital is the real interest rate, r.  In principle, then, the 
firm’s specific real capital can be sold at the end of the period to pay the debt. 
 The firm generates sales revenue, R, before taxes and expenses. We assume that the price 
of the good is given at unity, and then total sales revenue depends on production, which depends 
positively on both the amount of real capital in the firm and on the amount of labor effort. For 
simplicity, it is assumed that the owner is the only employee in the firm, and that he puts in the same 
labor effort in all three cases. But the level of fixed capital may vary across different firms, such that 
profits depend positively on the given amount of real capital in the firm: R(K). This enables a 
comparison between firms with different capital intensity. Let profits be represented by the function  
(2) ( ) KR K X r K= + ⋅ , 
where X is a parameter that represents the basic profit in the firm. The parameter kr represents the 
additional revenue generated by having a more capital intensive production.   
 Income is taxed at the basic proportional tax rate tb, which applies to corporate income, 
capital income, and labor income. In addition, labor income is taxed by a progressive surtax, tl, which 
depends positively on wages, W, and the taxable imputed return to labor under the split model, I: 
(3) ( ).lt W I+  
We also include the social security tax for wage earners and self-employed in tl, suppressing that the 
fee for wage earners is somewhat lower. The payroll tax or the employer’s social security 
contributions, te, applies to all wage payments by the corporation, but not to the imputed return to 
labor. 
 The imputed return to labor under the split model is given by profits net of the imputed 
return to capital, ir K⋅ , where ir  is the imputation rate. In addition, a wage deduction at the rate g of 
all wage payments applies for the closely held corporation. Negative imputed return to labor cannot be 
used as a deduction against taxable wage income, but it can be forwarded to deduct against future 
positive imputed return to labor in the same firm. We only consider one period here, and thus no 
deductions from previous years exist. Taxable imputed return to labor, I, is positive if the imputed 
return to labor is positive, and zero if it is negative.  
                                                     
6 We simplify by assuming that the legally required amount of capital for founding a corporation is 0. 
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 As a self-employed, the owner is taxed under the split model. Alternatively he can 
incorporate, which implies a transaction cost of j. The owner holds the share z of the stocks in the new 
corporation, and he sells the rest to passive owners. The income from selling shares to passive owners, 
S, depends on his ownership share, and on how close the share price is to the actual value of the firm. 
The value of the firm is usually set as the risk compensated present value of all future dividend 
payments to the shareholders. But as we here only consider one period, the value of the firm to passive 
shareholders is the risk compensated dividend payments in the present period. If the passive owners 
are close family members, the entrepreneur might prefer to demand a low price on the shares. This is 
captured by the parameter 10 ≤≤ m , which indicates how close the actual value of the firm is to the 
sales price of the shares. Sales income from shares can also be set to 0, if the passive owners are, for 
instance, adult children or grandchildren, such that the corporation then serves as an intergenerational 
tax free transfer of funds through the payment of dividends. The income from selling shares is then 
represented by 
(4) (1 ) (1 )pS z m r D= − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ , 
where pr  represents the risk compensation in the sales price of the shares and D is dividends. Capital 
gains taxes at the rate of bt  apply to the income from selling shares. The tax code that the individual 
faces after incorporation depends on his ownership share. If he holds two thirds of the shares or more, 
the corporation is defined as closely held and taxed according to the split model. The corporation is 
defined as widely held, and thus taxed according to corporate tax rules, if he holds less than two thirds 
of the shares.  
 There is a direct cost of incorporating in the form of a registration fee. In addition, 
corporations have stricter accounting requirements and therefore higher accountant costs. Let the costs 
of incorporating be represented by j.  
Post-tax income as self-employed 
The self-employed individual (denoted by subscript s) owns the firm and has full disposal over total 
sales income. His after-tax income Ys is given as net of basic income tax sales revenue, net of surtax 
levied on the taxable imputed return to labor:  
(5) ( ) ( ) ,1)(1 KrtItKRtY bslbs ⋅⋅−−⋅−⋅−=  
where R(K) is given by Equation (2) and the tax rate on labor income is specified by Equation (3). The 
self-employed individual receives no wages, and thus the labor income tax rate only depends on the 
taxable imputed return to labor under the split model, Is, which can be seen as: 
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( ) ( ) 0
0
i i
s
R r r K if R r r K
I
otherwise
⎧ − + ⋅ − + ⋅ >⎪= ⎨⎪⎩
 
Post-tax income in a closely held corporation 
Subscript c denotes the variables when the owner organizes as a closely held corporation. The 
corporation is taxed according to the split model when the active owner holds two thirds or more of 
the shares. The active owner receives wage income from the corporation, Wc, as well as his share zc < 
two thirds of dividends, Dc. All net of taxes and expenses sales revenue are distributed as dividends 
from the corporation, 
(6) ( ) ( )( )1 1c b e cD t R t W r K= − ⋅ − + ⋅ − ⋅ . 
The active owner's net of taxes income in the closely held corporation is then given by net of taxes 
wage income from the corporation and dividend receipts,7 in addition to income from selling shares to 
the passive owner. Other factors that matter for his total after-tax income are preference for control, h, 
and transaction costs of incorporation, j. His after-tax total income is then represented by: 
(7) ( ) ( ) .11 jStDzItWttY cbccclclbc −⋅−+⋅+⋅−⋅−−=  
Labor income taxes apply to the imputed return to labor in the corporation, even if this is not actually 
received by the individual. The imputed return to labor is calculated from business profits, which is 
sales revenue net of wage and capital costs, 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 0
0
e i e i
c
R t g r r K if R t g r r K
I
otherwise
⎧ − + + − + ⋅ − + + − + ⋅ >⎪= ⎨⎪⎩
 
The wage deduction as a fraction, g, of all wage payments made by the corporation applies in the 
calculation of the taxable imputed return to labor in the closely held corporation.  
Post-tax income in a widely held corporation 
Subscript v denotes the variables when the business is organized as a widely held corporation. The 
active owner holds less than two thirds of the shares, zv < 2/3, and the business is taxed according to 
corporate tax rules. All net of taxes and expenses sales revenue are distributed as dividends from the 
corporation, 
                                                     
7 We abstract from the short period of dividend taxation and assume that dividends are tax-exempt. 
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(8) ( ) ( )( )1 1v b e vD t R t W r K= − ⋅ − + ⋅ − ⋅ . 
The active owner's after tax income is given by net of taxes wage income, as well as his net of taxes 
share of dividend income. As in the previous case, he receives income from selling shares to the 
passive owner,  
(9) ( ) ( ) jStDzWttY vbvvvlbv −⋅−+⋅+⋅−−= 11 . 
The owner of a small business decides how much wages to pay. Since labor income taxes are 
progressive, we expect the widely held corporation to pay some wage to the active owner at low 
marginal labor income tax rates. As the tax rate on labor income increases, it will be optimal to 
convert more payments into dividends.  
 The widely held corporation considered here is typically a smaller, often family owned 
corporation, whose objective it is to maximize the income of the active shareholder. This is in contrast 
to larger corporations listed on the stock exchange whose goals often are to maximize the stock values 
of the corporations. 
3.3. Some examples of economic outcomes under various conditions 
Let us now investigate graphically which is the optimal organizational form under different conditions. 
To exemplify incentive structures we use the tax code for 1999, as seen in Table 1.8 For simplification 
we use the following parameter values in figures 2-4: 1cz = , 0.66vz = ,  0.05pr = , 0.02Kr = , 1m = , 
and  j = 0. Remember that profits, R(K), are defined in Equation (2) as basic profits X plus the 
additional return to increasing capital intensity, Kr K . 
 
Table 1. Tax parameters in 1999 
Basic personal allowance in labor income  NOK34,900 (USD4,930) 
Basic income tax rate, tax on capital and corporate income, tb 28 % 
Social security contributions, wage earners, included in tl 7.8 % 
Social security contributions, self-employed, included in tl 10.7 % 
Surtax on labor income above NOK269,100 (USD38,000), tl 13.5 % 
Payroll tax, employer’s social security contributions, te 14.1 % 
Imputation rate for capital income under the split model, ri 11 % 
Wage deduction rate under the split model, g 20 % 
 
                                                     
8 Here and throughout the paper we use the average exchange rate for 2003, 1 USD = 7.08 NOK, to convert into US dollars. 
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 The tax incentives for the self-employed individual to incorporate increase in the size of 
business income, as clearly seen in Figure 2 and Figure 3. When business income (X) is low, in Figure 
2 illustrated by NOK200,000 (USD28,250), most income is taxed as imputed return to capital under 
the split model. Only very labor intensive firms have positive imputed returns to labor. As the capital 
intensity in the firm increases, so do the business income and the imputed return to capital, and an 
increasing share of business income is taxed as imputed return to capital under the split model. This is 
why it is more advantageous to be taxed under the split model at high capital intensities; all business 
income is taxed as capital income, without having to share dividends with passive owners as in the 
widely held corporation. The reason why the closely held corporation organization is preferred over 
self-employment is that the rate for the social security contributions is 2.9 percentage points higher for 
the self-employed. By relaxing some of the assumptions above, we would see that positive transaction 
costs, such a registration fees, would make shifting from self-employment to a corporate form less 
advantageous, whereas it would not influence conversion from a closely held organization into a 
widely held firm organization. Increased risk aversion of the individual has the opposite effect. 
Preferences for control tend to favor self-employment and a closely held firm organization. 
 
Figure 2. After-tax income under different organizational forms. Low business income 
(NOK200,000) and no wage payments. All figures in NOK (1USD= NOK7.08) 
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 A successful business that generates high business income (X), illustrated by 
NOK3,000,000 (USD423,730) in Figure 3, has great tax minimizing incentives for avoiding the split 
model and becoming a widely held corporation. For firms with low capital intensities, typically liberal 
professions as medical doctors and dentists, the after-tax income of the individual organized in a 
widely held corporation is remarkably higher than that of a self-employment or a closely held firm 
organization. The reason for this is that at low capital intensities, most business income is taxed as 
imputed return to labor under the split model. The difference in the top marginal tax rates on labor and 
capital income is 21.3 percentage points for owners of closely held firms (excluding the payroll tax, as 
no wages are paid here) and 24.2 percentage points for the self-employed. As the capital intensity of 
the firm increases, we see that the difference in after-tax income between a widely held firm 
organization and the two other organizational forms is reduced. The reason is that higher capital 
intensity of the firm gives higher imputed return to capital, which lowers the share of income taxed as 
labor income (the imputed return to labor).  
 As we see in these examples, self-employment is the least favorable organizational form 
for a successful business that generates high income. If the individual for some reason prefers to have 
some of the return to his labor effort paid as wages, this would affect the incentives to incorporate. 
Fjærli and Lund (2001) show that owners of corporations may pay themselves more wages and less 
dividends than is optimal from a short term tax minimization motive. In a long term perspective it can 
be optimal to receive more wage payments, which future social security and pension benefits are based 
upon. 
 Now, consider a case where the business income (X) is moderate, illustrated by 
NOK1,000,000 (USD141,240) and wage payments (WC, WV) are high, illustrated by NOK500,000 
(USD70,620), see Figure 4. This gives us a different picture of the preferred organizational form. In 
terms of post-tax income, the widely held firm organization is only preferable for businesses with 
relatively low capital intensity, as the imputed return to labor is high for these firms under the split 
model. For the closely held firm organization, wage payments reduce the imputed return to labor 
proportionally, but the imputed return to labor is still positive for low capital intensities. As the capital 
intensity and thus also the business income increases, the imputed return to labor declines, until it 
reaches zero. Total tax payments are lower for self-employment, as all income is taxed as capital 
income at 28 percent, while top surtaxes apply to wage receipts of the owner of the closely and widely 
held corporation.9 In addition, one third of dividends are paid to passive owners in the widely held 
corporation, making this the least favorable form for firms with high capital intensities. The more the 
                                                     
9 As social security tax applies to imputed return to labor under the split model, this also entitles to future social security 
benefits. But as we see, for the self-employed, imputed return to labor approaches zero as capital intensities increase, making 
this a less favorable form for high capital intensities, even though it is the preferred form from a tax minimization view.   
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active owner prefers to have full control over his firm, the more advantageous is the closely held 
corporation over the widely held corporation as organizational form, as a positive parameter h shifts 
this curve upwards.  
 
Figure 3.  After-tax income under different organizational forms. High business income 
(NOK3,000,000) and no wage payments. All figures in NOK (1USD= NOK7.08) 
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 In all these examples we assume that the owner receives the full market price for the 34 
percent of the shares in the widely held corporation that he sells to passive owners. If, on the other 
hand, the passive owners are close family members, he may charge a lower price for the shares, such 
that 1m < . This would apparently shift the line for the after-tax income of the individual in the case of 
the widely held corporation downwards and increase the relative attractiveness of the other 
organizational forms. But if the individual does this, he probably internalizes the fact that instead of 
paying taxes, he distributes dividends tax-exempt to close family members. He then avoids the split 
model, increases his after-tax income, distributes tax-exempt income to his family, and avoids gift and 
bequest taxes. This would shift his perceived after-tax income upwards, increasing the relative 
attractiveness of the widely held corporation as an organizational form.  
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Figure 4.  After-tax income under different organizational forms. Moderate business income 
(NOK1,000,000) and high wage payments (NOK500,000). All figures in NOK 
(1USD=NOK7.08) 
400,000
450,000
500,000
550,000
600,000
650,000
700,000
750,000
800,000
0
1,
00
0,
00
0
2,
00
0,
00
0
3,
00
0,
00
0
4,
00
0,
00
0
5,
00
0,
00
0
6,
00
0,
00
0
Value of the real capital in the firm
A
ft
er
-t
ax
 in
co
m
e 
of
 th
e 
ow
ne
r
Widely held
corporation
Closely
held
corporation
Self-
employed
 
 
 In this section we have discussed organizational form incentives for owners of small 
firms. In particular we highlight factors likely to encourage adoption of the widely held firm 
organization. These incentives are particularly strong for businesses with high imputed labor income, 
such as when the business owner is running a labor intensive type of firm. In the next section we build 
on these insights to devise an evaluation model that can help us establish how the Norwegian split 
model affects choice of organizational form and, in turn, owners’ after-tax income. 
4. Data and empirical strategy 
We set out here our empirical strategy for identifying a possible causal relationship between dual 
income features, organizational shifts and income gains. It should be emphasized that our objective is 
to assess outcomes and motives for owners of small businesses that have been involved in 
organizational shifts; the results are not meant to be generalizable to outcomes for a randomly selected 
business owner.  
 In order to evaluate the effects of income shifting, we compare individuals that have 
shifted with those that have not changed their business’s organizational form. The first group consists 
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of self-employed and business owners in closely held corporations who become owners and 
employees in a widely held corporation. The second group is owners of small businesses who continue 
to organize their activities through self-employment or through a closely held corporation. A major 
challenge in such analyses is to obtain information about individual movements across different 
organizational forms, so let us first focus on the data we have had available for this study. 
4.1. Data 
One of the primary sources of data for this study was Income statistics on persons and families, see 
Statistics Norway (2006a). These statistics hold register-based information on the whole population, 
derived primarily from information retrieved from all income tax returns in the Directorate of Taxes' 
Register of Personal Tax-Payers. Numerous demographic variables are also included from other 
sources. We chose 1993 to start the analysis because that was when the register itself was established. 
 We want to restrict the scope of our analysis to individuals with a connection to 
workforce, and therefore exclude pensioners and students. In order to do that we restrict our attention 
to prime aged individuals, i.e., persons aged 25–55 in the period 1993–2003, earning a wage or 
business income in excess of the Basic Pension Unit of the National Insurance Scheme in every year 
of the period. In 1993 the Basic Pension Unit was NOK37,033 (USD5,230), whereas it was 
NOK55,964 (USD7,900) in 2003. After these restrictions, we have a sample of approximately 900,000 
individuals, including both wage earners and self-employed. 
 As the focus here is on tax-payers that shift from self-employment or active ownership in 
a closely held corporation, we restrict to individuals taxed under the split model of the dual income tax 
initially in the period under consideration. Many business owners in closely held corporations will 
have negative imputed wage income under the split model as negative values are carried forward from 
earlier years (see Section 3). Our results apply only to business owners reporting positive imputed 
wage income initially in the period under consideration (in 1993, 1994 or 1995).10 Further, farmers 
and fishermen are usually defined as self-employed.11 However, Norwegian primary industries are 
heavily subsidized and regulated, and we thus exclude this group from the sample. After these 
restrictions the sample consists of approximately 126,000 individuals. We will return to further sample 
restrictions shortly. 
 There are three categories of business owners: self-employed; owners of closely held 
corporations under the split-model; and owners of widely held corporations. The self-employed are 
identified by reporting business income from self-employment (positive or negative). Owners of 
                                                     
10 In the robustness checks to follow we provide results for other sample restrictions. 
11 See also Parker (2004) on discussions of definitions of firms.  
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closely held corporations are recognized in that they report imputed labor income under the split 
model in combination with reporting wage income. Previously, it has not been possible to identify 
whether a self-employed individual who becomes a wage earner has simply abandoned the business in 
preference for wage work, or continues his activities in an incorporated firm, as an employee in his 
own corporation. However, information held in the newly established Register of Shareholders can be 
combined with data from the End of the Year Certificate Register12 to yield new opportunities for 
linking information about persons holding a major shareholder position in the same corporation in 
which they are employed. Combining information from these two registers holds the promise of 
identifying active owners in widely held corporations. However, as 2004 is the first year for which 
data is included in the Register of Shareholders, we need to rely on data from 2004 to establish end-of-
period status. As we have a longitudinal perspective in this analysis, we need to make assumptions 
about status in previous years. This we do relatively simply as follows: we let information on status in 
2004 determine status in 2003. If the data suggest that subjects were likely wage earners previous to 
2003, we assume that this holds true for the preceding years. If they are identified as self-employed or 
in a closely held corporation in preceding years, in the business will likely have changed 
organizational mode in the period.  
 We describe the empirical strategy and data in more detail in the next section.  
4.2. Empirical strategy 
There are numerous challenges to identifying the relationship between income tax features, 
organizational shifts and income gains. One limiting factor is data. The data we have available for this 
study do not detail income generating activities of business owners. For instance, there are no data on 
working hours, which restricts interpretative outcomes. It is well known that taxes influence incomes 
through a number of channels, a leading example being changes in labor supply and pre-tax incomes 
because of changes in marginal tax rates. Similarly, an organizational move which reduces the tax 
burden will also most likely influence pre-tax incomes, as many will use the higher income to reduce 
work burden, corresponding to an income effect. As data do not facilitate a closer identification of 
such behavior, we have to rely on a less structural approach, focusing on post-tax income resulting 
from tax reducing organizational shifts and other individual characteristics, without discussing how 
organizational shifts influence pre-tax incomes.   
 The fact that variables are simultaneous presents another obstacle. In the case of tax 
motivated organizational shifts, obviously, organizational shifts and incomes are simultaneously 
determined. This is a key issue in the identification of causal relationships in the following. 
                                                     
12 See Statistics Norway (2006b) and Statistics Norway (2006c) for documentation of the two registers, respectively. 
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Let us first consider a general outline of the determination of post-tax income. We observe outcomes 
in terms of post-tax income for each individual (i) at a point in time (t), yit, that is assumed to be 
explained by a number of time-varying and individual-specific variables, xit, and a variable 
representing choice of organizational form, OFit. Using the same notation as in Section 3, we allow the 
organizational form variable to take three values, indexed by j: { }, ,j s c v∈ ; s symbolize self-
employment, c representing closely held firm organization and v denoting widely held firms. The 
outcome is also influenced by individual specific effects, including a constant, ai , and time-invariant 
observable variables, qi, a time effect, γt, and unobserved factors, uit,  
(9) ( )it it jit i i t ity x OF a q uβ η λ γ= + + + + + , 
where β, η and λ are parameters.  
 We assume that the tax-payers behave according to a longer time horizon than the 
calendar year when they choose legal organizational form.13 The behavioral adjustments we discuss 
here are sluggish in the sense that we cannot expect to see year-specific shifts in organizational form 
in response to small changes in tax rates. Moreover, in accordance with the exposition in Section 3, we 
assume that some individuals choose to move out of self-employment or a closely held corporation to 
establish a widely held corporation because of the dual income tax system itself, and less because of 
adjustments in schedules over time. This suggests that information about year-specific individual 
behavior is less useful here. Our fairly long panel covering 1993–2003 means that we exploit 
information about individuals over a longer time period. One option is to categorize the 11 years of 
data into two time periods, for instance 1993–1997 and 1999–2003, and see how incomes develop in 
relation to organizational shifts. The main reason for using three time periods is to allow for a period 
in which organizational shifts can happen. At this stage, let us assume that the organizational shift 
variable can be represented by a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual has been involved 
in income shifting activities. If the dummy variable takes value 1 in one of the periods, the effect on 
post-tax income will depend on whether the organizational shift was undertaken early or late in the 
period and the effects are in danger of being blurred. Therefore, we have found it advantageous to 
adopt a tripartite division, { }1,2,3t∈ , referring to 1993–1995, 1996–2000 and 2001–2003, 
respectively, assigning the longer middle period for organizational shifts to happen. By also 
employing a first differenced version of Equation (9), we can use the first and the last period post-tax 
income to define iyΔ ,  
                                                     
13 According to the behavioral hierarchy of Slemrod (1995), avoidance behavior is not as responsive as timing decisions, but 
less sluggish than real responses.  
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(10) ( ) ( ) ( )3 1 3 1 3 1 2 3 1i i i i i i i iy y x x q IS u uγ γ β λ δ− = − + − + + + − , 
or 
(11) 2i i i i iy x q ISα β λ δ εΔ = + Δ + + + . 
Income growth is explained by a constant, α, differences in time-varying variables, Δxi, by time-
invariant variables, qi, and most importantly, an index function, ISi2. ISi2 takes the value 1 if the 
following condition is fulfilled: the combination j s= or j c= at 1t =  in combination with j v=  at 
3t = ; otherwise ISi2 takes the value 0.14 δ is a parameter. The constant, α, will also capture the time 
effect ( )3 1γ γ− . The new error term, εi , is assumed to be i.i.d. The constant term of the individual 
effect is eliminated, corresponding to differencing out the individual fixed effect, whereas it is not 
ruled out that the time-invariant observable variables can have effects on income growth.  
 Next, as already noted, under the assumption that tax-payers incorporate in order to 
reduce the tax burden, the increase in post-tax income and the income shifting variable, Δyi and ISi2, 
are simultaneous variables. This suggests that tax-payers’ behavior can be presented by two equations, 
where Equation (11) is combined with an equation which describes income shifting as determined by 
the interrelationship between dual income tax features and characteristics of the business owners. For 
instance, Section 3 listed several factors likely to influence decisions to go for a widely held firm 
organization: wide disparity between marginal tax rates on wage income and capital income 
(applicable to business owners of businesses with low capital intensity resulting in high imputed wage 
income – business profit net of imputed return to capital); low transaction cost of shifting; the level of 
control over the business. The index function for the shift is specified as 
(12) 2 1 1i i i iIS z qπ η γ υ= + + + . 
 Equation (12) depicts the decision to shift as following from a number of individual 
specific period 1 characteristics, zi1, whereas qi1 symbolizes that other variables from Equation (11) 
may also enter into the shift equation. η and γ are parameters, π is a constant and υi is the (i.i.d.) error 
term. We notice that this set-up, i.e., using two equations to establish relationships, is identical to an 
instrumental variable estimation procedure; a feature we will exploit in the following. 
 We focus on predetermined variables from period 1 as explanatory variables in Equation 
(12). Imputed wage income under the split model is an obvious variable to explain shifts, as high 
imputed income means a large difference between marginal tax rates on capital income and wage 
income: the marginal tax rate for capital income being fixed at 28 percent and the marginal tax rate for 
                                                     
14 We are not interested in business owners with j=v for t=1, see on for sample restrictions. 
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wage income around and above 50 percent, see Table A1 in the Appendix for description of schedules 
for business income 1993–2003. 
 Related to the level of wage income, we have also tried to identify business categories 
where the efforts of the owners are assumed to have particularly strong effect on incomes. For 
business owners in closely held firms we have used (period 1) information from the Register of 
Company Accounts, see Statistics Norway (2005), assuming that doctors, lawyers, dentists and 
architects belong to labor intensive or human capital intensive businesses. Remember that incentives 
depend on the value of the real capital of the firm, as highlighted in Section 3. We do not have similar 
information for the self-employed. However, a modification in the tax schedule enforced in 1995 may 
be helpful in order to establish the capital intensity of the self-employed. Previous to 1995, residual 
profit above a certain level was taxed as capital income, as is seen in Table A1 in the Appendix. From 
1995 this was changed, reflected by the rather complicated schedules from 1995 and onwards in the 
table. However, the new schedule is not uniform, as it distinguishes between occupations that are less 
and more human capital intensive, such as dentists, doctors and lawyers, assuming that a larger 
proportion of their income originates from human capital activities and therefore should be taxed as 
(imputed) labor income. Since our data are based on registers of income tax returns, and we have 
access to information that is reported to the tax authorities in order to establish tax payments, we are 
able to discriminate between self-employed who are in a labor intensive business and others. However, 
as this information is collected for 1996, a year belonging to the middle period which is allocated for 
shifts of organizational form in our econometric set-up, there are measurement problems in relation to 
this variable.  
 Next, are there any tax rate features that can be used to explain shifts? High levels of 
marginal tax rates will most likely be captured by the variable representing imputed wage income. 
Here, we therefore exploit the geographical variation in (effective) marginal tax rates engendered by 
the payroll tax scheme. The Norwegian payroll tax is differentiated with respect to geography into five 
zones, determined both with regard to remoteness from urban centers and to less favorable economic 
conditions for businesses. In 1993, 14.3 percent of gross labor income was charged in zone 1 
(covering most of the population), whereas the rate decreases in other zones by degree of remoteness; 
10.8, 6.6, and 5.3, ending with a zero tax rate in zone 5. A problem with this explanatory variable is 
that the payroll tax is paid both by closely held firms and widely held firms, which means that not all 
business owners are likely to be influenced by these incentives. 
 As noted in Section 3, it is less costly to transfer a closely held firm organization into a 
widely held firm than self-employment into a widely held firm, as the costs of incorporation have 
24 
already been taken. In accordance with this, we would expect a closely held organization to facilitate 
shifts as well.  
4.3. More detailed descriptions of variables 
Before discussing explanations of shifting and the relationship between shifts and income growth 
more closely, we provide descriptive statistics. As we focus on incomes from market work activities, 
tax-exempt transfers are deducted from the after-tax income concept. We calculate average post-tax 
income by aggregating post-tax incomes minus tax-free transfers in period 1 (1993–1995) and in 
period 3 (2001–2003). For simplicity’s sake, we denote this variable as post-tax income in the 
following.15  
 Regarding sample restrictions, we limit to individuals who are self-employed or active 
owners in a closely held corporation in 1995, who own more than 20 percent of the shares in the 
corporation, and whose income of period 3 is less than 50 times larger than income of period 1. We 
also exclude some business owners with a large increase in business activities, assuming that their 
shifts into a widely held corporation follows from firm maturity reasons. We do that by using 
information from the Register of Company Accounts, see Statistics Norway (2005), excluding owners 
of firms where the number of employees has increased by more than 4 persons from period 1 to period 
3.16 The resulting sample is approximately 105,700 individuals, including approximately 5,800 
persons who have shifted organizational status in the period between 1995 and 2001. 
 In Table 2 we present average measures for a number of variables, highlighting 
differences between business owners that shifted organizational status in the middle period and 
business owners still organized as self-employed or in a closely held corporation. Note that all income 
measures in Table 2 are adjusted to the 2003 level by using measures for average wage growth in the 
period. The table shows that (yearly) average post-tax income is higher for those that shifted into a 
widely held corporation, both before and after the shift. However, Table 2 reveals some important 
information. Firstly, average growth is higher among “shifters” than “non-shifters” – 31 percent and 
15 percent. Secondly, dividends constitute a major part of income in Period 3 of business owners 
involved in shifts: close to 40 percent of income comes from dividends in period 3, and the (absolute) 
difference in dividends between period 1 and 3 exceeds the difference for post-tax income. This is not 
the case with the business owners not involved in shifts, even though they also enjoyed significantly 
higher dividends; the increase in percent is pretty much equal in the two groups. There was an overall 
                                                     
15 Note that in the regressions to come, the endogenous variable is defined by taking differences in natural logarithms of the 
income variables, ∆log(y3/y1), approaching percentage growth in post-tax income. 
16 Note that this can only be done for business owners in closely held corporations in period 1. 
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increase in dividend receipts among individuals over this period, as documented by Thoresen (2004). 
One may suspect that period 3 estimates are influenced by the temporary tax on dividends in 2001. 
However, we assume that lower payments to shareholders in 2001 were counteracted by higher 
payments in the two following years, all three years belonging to period 3.17 
 We see that the high post-tax income growth among “shifters” is matched by a reduction 
in gross income minus dividends, see Table 2. Gross income includes all taxable income components, 
as wage, income from self-employment, taxable pensions, capital income (dividends included), but 
does not include non-taxable transfers, such as the child benefit. Here, we subtract dividends to 
examine to what extent the increase in dividends among “shifters” is counteracted by lower income 
growth for other income components. The results of Table 2 strongly suggest such offsetting behavior: 
whereas the “non-shifters” experienced growth on 8 percent for gross income (minus dividends), the 
same income concept for “shifters” decreased by 8 percent.  
 Imputed labor income from the splitting procedure is also established by aggregating this 
income measure over the three years of period 1 and then dividing by 3. Note that this variable does 
not take negative values and therefore is truncated at 0.18 In Section 3 it was established that high 
levels of imputed labor income fortify incentives to incorporate, and we see that estimates in Table 2 
support this; business owners who established a widely held corporation had high imputed labor 
income in period 1. Table 2 also reveals that there is a large difference between “shifters” and “non-
shifters” regarding period 1 organizational form: approximately 23 percent of the “shifters” were 
organized in a closely held corporation, whereas the share among the “nonshifters” was much smaller, 
only 5 percent.  
 Further, regarding other potential explanators for shift, the share combining a closely held 
firm organization and belonging to a labor intensive business is larger among “shifters”, whereas no 
such differences can be seen for the combination of self-employment and human capital intensity. 
Neither do we observe differences between “shifters” and “non-shifters” with respect to the payroll 
tax. We also note that the share of males and people located in the largest cities is larger among 
“shifters”. 
 The alternative hypothesis is that shifts in legal organizational form are simply part of the 
natural life cycle of firms. Under this hypothesis we would expect “incorporators” to be older than the 
others. This is not borne out, however, by the estimates presented in Table 2, as age levels are rather 
                                                     
17 The amounts of dividends received by households from 2000 and onwards is (measured in billion NOK and with the year 
in parentheses): 29.2 (2000), 13.0 (2001), 42.3 (2002), 55.0 (2003), 62.8 (2004), 99.6 (2005).    
18 It can in fact be negative, but insofar as it doesn’t generate tax liability, the information is not required by the tax 
authorities, who have established the data we use here. 
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similar. However, remember that sample restrictions were introduced to avoid including business 
owners involved in organizational shifts for maturity reasons.    
 
Table 2.  Summary statistics: mean and standard deviation in parentheses. All income 
measures wage adjusted to 2003 and measured in NOK 
 Non-shifters Shifters  All 
Yearly average post-tax income, 
period 1 
281,346 
(678,640) 
364,918 
(314,910) 
285,898 
(664,247) 
Yearly average post-tax income, 
period 3 
322,408 
(746,592) 
478,526 
(874,288) 
330,913 
(754,932) 
Yearly average dividends, 
period 1 13,757 (256,280) 51,456 (234,258) 15,811 (255,272) 
Yearly average dividends, 
period 3 45,084 (665,047) 
184,789 
(916,369) 52,695 (681,862) 
Gross income minus dividends, 
yearly average, period 1 
397,833 
(965,106) 
498,703 
(338,041) 
403,328 
(873,426) 
Gross income minus dividends, 
yearly average, period 3 
428,299 
(916,642) 
463,432 
(306,485) 
430,213 
(504,145) 
Yearly average imputed labor 
income, period 1 
150,490 
(306,297) 
220,075 
(368,205) 
154,281 
(310,388) 
Dummy for closely held 
corporation, period 1 0.046 (0.209) 0.229 (0.420) 0.056 (0.230) 
Payroll tax in % 12.1 (3.6) 12.5 (3.4) 12.2 (3.5) 
Dummy for human capital 
intensive business, closely held 
corporation, period 1 
0.009 (0.093) 0.104 (0.305) 0.014 (0.117) 
Dummy for human capital 
intensive business, self-
employment, period 1 
0.129 (0.335) 0.104 (0.305) 0.128 (0.334) 
Years of education 11.75 (2.47) 11.78 (2.18) 11.75 (2.46) 
Dummy for Oslo-area and 4 
large cities  0.257 (0.437) 0.299 (0.458) 0.259 (0.438) 
Male 0.721 (0.477) 0.846 (0.361) 0.728 (0.445) 
Age 39.3 (5.7) 39.3 (5.7) 39.3 (5.7) 
Age squared 1576 (444) 1,578 (439) 1,576 (444) 
Dummy for children 0.794 (0.404) 0.787 (0.410) 0.794 (0.403) 
Married 0.650 (0.478) 0.675 (0.468) 0.651 (0.404) 
Number of obs. 99,925 5,757 105,682 
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5. Results 
5.1 The decision to shift organizational form 
We now move on to multivariate analyses. The setup in terms of two equations, (11) and (12), is in 
accordance with an approach where we study explanations to income growth, where we use Equation 
(12) to form fitted values based on instrumental variables for the shift variable, the latter being 
simultaneous to income growth. However, explanations of shifts have intrinsic interest. Let us 
therefore take a closer look at the relationship between shifts and other variables. We do this by 
estimating a probit model for the probability of shifting into a widely held corporation. In addition to 
the candidates for instrumental variables, as log of the first-period imputed labor income, the payroll 
tax, and dummy variables indicating closely held firm organization and labor intensive business, we 
also include other individual characteristics in the regressions, such as age, parenthood, geographical 
location, etc.  
 Results are presented in Table 3. We find strong and clearly significant effects for the 
level of imputed labor income (under the split model) in period 1 and being organized in closely held 
corporations in period 1. We see that the payroll tax contributes negatively to the probability of 
shifting into a widely held corporation. However, as noted above, this variable is problematical as it 
both influences incentives to shift and to stay in a closely held firm organizational form. Hence we 
will not employ this variable as an instrument in the following. We do use it however as an 
explanatory variable for income growth, representing remote geographical location, ranging from 1 to 
5.   
 The dummy variables for human capital intensity have different effects, dependent on 
whether the agents are organized in closely held corporations or in self-employment; combining a 
closely held corporation and belonging to a human capital intensive business strongly increases the 
probability to shifts, whereas human capital intensity within self-employment contributes negatively. 
However, as described above, this information for the self-employed is collected for 1996, a year 
belonging to the middle period which is allocated for shifts of organizational form in our econometric 
set-up, there are serious measurement problems in relation to this variable. Thus, we will not use this 
variable in the following.   
 We see that being male increases the probability to shift substantially, and in the 
estimation of Equation (11) below we address evidence for males, separately. 
 
28 
Table 3.  Probit estimates for shift into widely held firm organization. Standard errors in 
parentheses 
Variable Parameter estimate 
Log of imputed labor income in period 1 0.071 (0.002) 
Closely held corporation in period 1 0.798 (0.020) 
Payroll tax  -0.004 (0.002) 
Dummy variable for human capital 
intensive business, closely held corporation 1.450 (0.036) 
Dummy variable for human capital 
intensive business, self-employment -0.406 (0.026) 
Years of education -0.020 (0.003) 
Dummy for Oslo-area and 4 large cities 0.019 (0.016) 
Male 0.296 (0.018) 
Age 4.0×10-4 (0.017) 
Age squared 1.0×10-4 (2.0×10-4) 
Dummy for children -0.065 (0.019) 
Married 0.089 (0.018) 
Log Likelihood -19,458 
Number of observations 105,682 
 
5.2. Organizational shifts and income growth 
We now estimate Equation (11) by instrumental variable techniques, where we utilize Equation (12) in 
the first stage. In the estimation, we employ the modification of the (k-class) limited information 
maximum likelihood (LIML) suggested by Fuller (1977)19 and denoted by Fuller-LIML in the 
following. We also estimate Equation (11) by ordinary least squares (OLS).  
 Although instrumental variable techniques are usually deemed preferable to OLS when 
there are simultaneity problems, they are encumbered by serious pitfalls. Discussions, see for instance 
recent contributions from Staiger and Stock (1997), Hahn and Hausman (2003), and Murray (2006), 
center on finding instruments for the shift variable which do not suffer from the same type of 
correlation with the error term of the main equation. This corresponds to finding valid instruments, but 
instruments must also have sufficient explanatory power, or not being “weak.” With respect to validity 
we rely on a test of overidentifying restrictions, as we have more potential instrumental variables than 
needed for identification in the first stage regressions. An Anderson-Rubin test, based on Anderson 
                                                     
19 We use value 2 for the Fuller constant. We do not find that results are sensitive to this choice. 
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and Rubin (1949), is used to check validity of instruments.20 Under the null hypothesis that valid 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term of the main equation, the test may compare a just 
identified equation with an equation with the full set of instruments employed. A small p-value leads 
to rejection of the null hypothesis that all instruments are valid. 
 As shown by Bound et al. (1995), Staiger and Stock (1997) and Hahn and Hausman 
(2003), the other problem, weak correlation of instruments to the variable they are intended to replace, 
may lead to seriously biased estimates even when the samples are large. This is the main reason for 
applying Fuller’s modification of LIML often recommended in such situations (Murray, 2006). It is 
more robust to the presence of weak instruments than other estimators, such as two-stage least squares 
(2SLS).  
 With reference to the theoretical outline given in Section 3 and the results presented in 
Table 3, we employ three instrumental variables in the first stage: a dummy variable indicating 
whether the person belonged to a closely held firm in period 1, a dummy variable indicating whether 
the person belonged to a human capital intensive business, and the level of imputed wage income 
(under the split model) in period 1. We show results of alternate specifications of the shift equation. 
Column (2) shows results when all three instruments are used in the first stage. The test estimator for 
the overidentifying restriction test is large, giving a small p-value, which means that the exogeneity of 
the overidentifying restrictions are rejected. Thus, columns (3)–(5) show results for pair-wise 
combinations of the three instruments, and columns (6)–(8) show results for exactly identified 
equations.  
 In the main equation we argue that income growth is explained by education, age, age 
squared, urban geographical location (living in the Oslo-area and 4 other large cities), the degree of 
remoteness (a variable ranging from 1 to 5 with 5 indicating the highest degree of remoteness), the 
gender of the business owner, having children and being married, in addition to the shift variable.  
 Results of the main equation are presented in Table 4. First of all we see that results of 
both the OLS and instrumental variable specifications predict substantial income growth for business 
owners choosing to shift organizational form, with the instrumental variables specifications exerting a 
stronger effect than OLS.   
 The Fuller-LIML estimations show wide variation, depending on which instrument(s) is 
used in the shift equation, estimates raging from 0.28 to 1.05. However, we see that all estimation 
results point in the same direction: income gains derived from shifting organizational form are 
substantial. Note that the results of the Anderson-Rubin overidentification test reject the 
                                                     
20 Results are in general not found to be sensitive to this choice for the test estimator. For instance, tests based on Sargan 
(1958) or Basmann (1960) for 2SLS give very similar results to those presented here.    
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overidentifying restrictions in most specifications, suggesting that not all instruments are valid. 
However, the restriction is not rejected for at least one specification; using imputed wage income and 
a closely held firm organization as instruments.  
 
Table 4. Regressions results: change in log of post-tax income as the dependent variable, 
105,682 obs. 
Variables 
(1) 
 
OLS 
(2) 
Fuller-
LIML 
(3) 
Fuller-
LIML 
(4) 
Fuller-
LIML 
(5) 
Fuller-
LIML 
(6) 
Fuller-
LIML 
(7) 
Fuller-
LIML 
(8) 
Fuller-
LIML 
Shift 0.092 (0.007) 
0.680 
(0.028) 
0.972 
(0.038) 
0.513 
(0.034) 
0.613 
(0.030) 
1.051 
(0.065) 
0.940 
(0.043) 
0.288 
(0.039) 
Years of education 0.009 (0.001) 
0.009 
(0.001) 
0.009 
(0.001) 
0.009 
(0.001) 
0.009 
(0.001) 
0.009 
(0.001) 
0.009 
(0.001) 
0.009 
(0.001) 
Dummy for Oslo-
area and 4 large 
cities 
0.034 
(0.004) 
0.028 
(0.004) 
0.025 
(0.004) 
0.029 
(0.004) 
0.028 
(0.004) 
0.024 
(0.004) 
0.025 
(0.004) 
0.032 
(0.004) 
Degree of 
remoteness 
-0.017 
(0.002) 
-0.015 
(0.002) 
-0.014 
(0.002) 
-0.015 
(0.002) 
-0.015 
(0.002) 
-0.013 
(0.002) 
-0.014 
(0.002) 
-0.016 
(0.002) 
Dummy for male -0.068 (0.004) 
-0.088 
(0.004) 
-0.099 
(0.004) 
-0.083 
(0.004) 
-0.086 
(0.004) 
-0.102 
(0.004) 
-0.102 
(0.004) 
-0.075 
(0.004) 
Age -0.036 (0.004) 
-0.037 
(0.004) 
-0.037 
(0.004) 
-0.036 
(0.004) 
-0.037 
(0.004) 
-0.037 
(0.004) 
-0.037 
(0.004) 
-0.036 
(0.004) 
Age squared 3×10
-4 
(5×10-5) 
3×10-4 
(5×10-5) 
3×10-4 
(5×10-5) 
3×10-4 
(5×10-5) 
3×10-4 
(5×10-5) 
3×10-4 
(5×10-5) 
3×10-4 
(5×10-5) 
3×10-4 
(5×10-5) 
Dummy for children -0.009 (0.004) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.008 
(0.004) 
Married 0.022 (0.004) 
0.015 
(0.004) 
0.012 
(0.004) 
0.017 
(0.004) 
0.016 
(0.004) 
0.011 
(0.004) 
0.012 
(0.004) 
0.020 
(0.004) 
Instruments:  
IMP = imputed wage 
income,  CHF = 
closely held corp.,  
HUMC = human 
capital intensive 
closely held corp. 
 
IMP 
CHF 
HUMC 
IMP 
CHF 
IMP 
HUMC 
CHF 
HUMC IMP CHF HUMC 
F value / R-square of 
the first stage  
779 / 
0.075 
513 / 
0.046 
564 / 
0.051 
755 / 
0.067 
229 / 
0.019 
446 / 
0.037 
475 / 
0.039 
p-values for 
Anderson-Rubin 
overidentific. test 
 < 0.001 0.123 < 0.001 < 0.001    
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 With respect to the other explanators, results are similar across specifications, and 
independent of the OLS or instrumental variables techniques used: education, living in the Oslo-area 
and 4 other large cities, and being married contribute positively to income growth, whereas age, being 
male, having children and living in remote areas mean lower income growth. All these results 
corroborate previous findings on Norwegian data, see Aarbu and Thoresen (2001) and Thoresen 
(2004), and are in line with expectations such as the positive effect of education on income growth, 
and the negative effect of children. 
5.3. Robustness checks 
Many choices regarding the sample selections and econometric specifications can be questioned. It is 
therefore useful to assess effects on parameter estimates when there are changes in the empirical 
approach. Such evidence is presented in Table 5 for a selection of changes and for a selection of 
instrumental variable specifications (instrumental variables as in columns (2)–(4) in Table 4). 
 In the first alternative, alternative (i), estimation is carried out for males only. Comparing 
parameter estimates for the shift variable of Table 4 and Table 5, we see that that results are less 
influenced by this sample restriction. The second and the third variant, alternative (ii) and alternative 
(iii), refer to a measurement problem when establishing the sample of small firms. As noted in Section 
4, we identify owners of closely held corporations in Period 1 when reporting positive labor income in 
period 1995. The problem is that the truncation of calculated imputed labor income at 0 means that 
owners of closely held corporations are only identified when reporting positive imputed labor income, 
and will be excluded form the sample if they, for instance, have temporary negative imputed labor 
income.21 Thus, we present results when the sample is established based on business owners 
qualifying for the definition in either of the three years of period 1, alternative (ii), and results when 
they meet the criteria in each year of the period, alternative (iii). Compared to estimation results from 
Table 4, the general impression is these sample restrictions have had little effect on results.  
 
                                                     
21 The self-employed are also identified by reporting self-employment income. 
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Table 5.  Robustness checks: parameter estimates for the shift variable for different empirical 
approaches. All estimations by the Fuller version of limited information maximum 
likelihood (Fuller-LIML) 
Changes in the 
empirical approach 
Instruments: IMP = 
imputed wage inc., CHF = 
closely held corp., HUMC 
= human capital intens. 
Closely held corp. 
Estimate for the 
shift variable, 
standard errors in 
parentheses  
p-values for Anderson-
Rubin overidentifying  
restriction test 
IMP, CHF, HUMC 0.754 (0.030) <0.001 
IMP, CHF 1.057 (0.040) 0.284 (i) Males only (76,905 obs.) 
IMP, HUMC 0.562 (0.037) <0.001 
IMP, CHF, HUMC 0.632 (0.032) <0.001 
IMP, CHF 1.014 (0.047) <0.001 
(ii) Less restrictive 
definition of period 1 
business owners 
(125,653 obs.) IMP, HUMC 0.452 (0.035) <0.001 
IMP, CHF, HUMC 0.790 (0.030) <0.001 
IMP, CHF 1.286 (0.054) 0.934 
(iii) More restrictive 
definition of period 1 
business owners 
(78,024 obs.) IMP, HUMC 0.578 (0.043) <0.001 
IMP, CHF, HUMC 0.815 (0.031) <0.001 
IMP, CHF 1.123 (0.041) <0.001 
(iv) Only 
instrumental 
variables IMP, HUMC 0.686 (0.039) <0.001 
 
 Lastly, we want to check if results are sensitive to the specification of the main equation. 
We therefore provide estimates when only the (the predicted) shift variable is used as explanatory 
variable. We see that parameter estimates increase somewhat by this. 
 To sum up, estimates for the shift variable are sensitive to the empirical approach taken, 
especially with respect to the choice of instrumental variables. However, estimates according to all 
specifications examined here corroborate a positive relationship between organizational shift and 
income growth. 
6. Concluding remarks 
The main reason for the scarcity of information about tax motivated organizational shifts for owners of 
small businesses is the lack of micro data that follow them across different organizational forms. In 
this paper we exploit that a newly established register of shareholders enables us to identify 
individuals who has shifted the legal form of their business activities into a widely firm corporation; 
combining being an employee and a major shareholder in the same corporation. Previous indications 
of movements from self-employment and closely held corporations into widely corporations have been 
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a major concern of Norwegian dual income tax system and it is fair to say that reform of the system in 
2006 was mainly motivated by expectations of people engaging in tax reducing organizational shifts.  
 Studying the behavior of more than 100,000 small business owner, initially either 
organized as self-employed or as a closely held corporation, we see that high imputed labor income 
under the split model, having the business organized in a closely held firm, and belonging to a human 
capital intensive business within a closely held corporation, increase the probability of moving into 
widely held corporations, suggesting some of the main predictions from the theoretical outline; agents 
move to avoid taxes and moves are encouraged by lower cost of shifts.  
 Moreover, we find that tax-payers who have shifted organizational form have 
experienced a much larger increase in post-tax income, compared to owners of small businesses who 
have not shifted. As there are reasons to assume that shifts and incomes are simultaneous variables, 
standard OLS regressions will give biased estimates. We therefore employ instrumental variable 
techniques, employing initial levels of imputed wage income, type of business and organization as a 
closely held corporation as instruments. The study strongly suggests that people have shifted into a 
widely held corporation for tax reasons, which have given them a substantial growth in post-tax 
income.  
 Overall, the empirical evidence presented support the view that owners of small 
businesses have avoided taxes by finding new organizational forms for their business activities, 
fortified by key features of the Norwegian dual income tax system in place from 1992 to 2004. Given 
that the policy-makers reformed the tax system because they anticipated such activities to take place, 
this study confirms that their suspicions were right.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1.  Marginal tax rates for wage income/business income under the split model for 
different income levels, 1993–2003 
Adjusted gross 
income (2003) 1993 1995
* 1997* 1999 2001 2003 
100,000 30.2/38.7 30.2/38.7 30.2/38.7 29.9/38.7 35.8/38.7 35.8/38.7 
200,000 30.2/38.7 30.2/38.7 30.2/38.7 35.8/38.7 29.6/38.7 35.8/38.7 
300,000 35.8/38.7 35.8/38.7 35.8/38.7 35.8/38.7 35.8/38.7 35.8/38.7 
400,000 49.5/52.4 49.5/52.4 49.5/52.4 49.3/52.4 49.3/52.2 49.3/52.2 
500,000 49.5/52.4 49.5/52.4 49.5/52.4 49.3/52.4 49.3/52.2 49.3/52.2 
600,000 49.5/52.4 49.5/52.4 49.5/52.4 49.3/52.4 49.3/52.2 49.3/52.2 
800,000 49.5 49.5 49.5 49.3 49.3 49.3 
1,000,000 49.5 49.5 49.5/28 49.3/28 55.3/28 55.3/28 
1,500,000 49.5 49.5/28 49.5/28 49.3/28 55.3/28 55.3/28 
2,000,000 49.5/28 49.5/28 49.5/28 49.3/28 55.3/28 55.3/28 
3,000,000 49.5/28 49.5/28 49.5/28 49.3/28 55.3/28 55.3/28 
4,000,000 49.5/28 49.5/28 49.5/28 49.3/28 55.3/28 55.3/28 
5,000,000 49.5/28 49.5 49.5 49.3 55.3 55.3 
10,000,000 49.5/28 49.5/28 49.5/28 49.3/28 55.3/28 55.3/28 
*Special regulations apply for dentists, lawyers and other independent contractors offering services to the general public.   
 
 
 
